Automated Temporal Equilibrium Analysis: Verification and Synthesis of
  Multi-Player Games by Gutierrez, Julian et al.
Automated Temporal Equilibrium Analysis:
Verication and Synthesis of Multi-Player Games
Julian Gutierreza, Muhammad Najibb, Giuseppe Perellic, Michael Wooldridged
aFaculty of Information Technology, Monash University
bDepartment of Computer Science, University of Kaiserslautern
cDepartment of Computer, Automatic, and Management Engineering, Sapienza University of Rome
dDepartment of Computer Science, University of Oxford
Abstract
In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verication problem is concerned
with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its con-
stituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in pursuit of indi-
vidual objectives. Typically, those objectives are expressed as temporal logic formulae
which the relevant agent desires to see satised. Unfortunately, rational verication
is computationally complex, and requires specialised techniques in order to obtain
practically useable implementations. In this paper, we present such a technique. is
technique relies on a reduction of the rational verication problem to the solution of
a collection of parity games. Our approach has been implemented in the Equilibrium
Verication Environment (EVE) system. e EVE system takes as input a model of a
concurrent/multi-agent system represented using the Simple Reactive Modules Lan-
guage (SRML), where agent goals are represented as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
formulae, together with a claim about the equilibrium behaviour of the system, also
expressed as an LTL formula. EVE can then check whether the LTL claim holds on
some (or every) computation of the system that could arise through agents choosing
Nash equilibrium strategies; it can also check whether a system has a Nash equilib-
rium, and synthesise individual strategies for players in the multi-player game. Aer
∗Corresponding author: Julian Gutierrez.
Email addresses: julian.gutierrez@monash.edu (Julian Gutierrez),
najib@cs.uni-kl.de (Muhammad Najib), perelli@diag.uniroma1.it (Giuseppe
Perelli), michael.wooldridge@cs.ox.ac.uk (Michael Wooldridge)
Preprint submied to Elsevier August 14, 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
05
63
8v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
20
presenting our basic framework, we describe our new technique and prove its cor-
rectness. We then describe our implementation in the EVE system, and present ex-
perimental results which show that EVE performs favourably in comparison to other
existing tools that support rational verication.
Keywords: Multi-agent systems, Temporal logic, Nash equilibrium, Bisimulation
invariance, Rational verication, Model checking, Synthesis.
1. Introduction
e deployment of AI technologies in a wide range of application areas over the
past decade has brought the problem of verifying such systems into sharp focus. Ver-
ication is the problem of ensuring that a particular system is correct with respect to
some specication. e most successful approach to automated formal verication is
that of model checking [24]. With this approach, we rst derive a nite state abstract
model of the system S being studied; a common approach involves representing the
system as a directed graph in which vertices correspond to states of the system, and
edges correspond to the execution of program instructions, or the performance of ac-
tions; branching in the graph represents either input from the environment, or choices
available to components of the system. With this approach, the directed graph is typi-
cally referred to as a labelled transition system, or Kripke structure: each path through
the transition system represents a possible execution or computation of the system S .
Correctness properties of interest are expressed as formulae ϕ of propositional tem-
poral logic—the most popular such logics for this purpose are Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) and the Computation Tree Logic (CTL). In the case of properties ϕ expressed as
LTL formulae, we typically want to check whether ϕ is satised on some or all pos-
sible computations of S , that is, on some or all possible paths through the transition
system/Kripke structure representing S .
Great advances have been made in model checking since the approach was rst
proposed in the early 1980s, and the technique is now widely used in industry. Never-
theless, the verication of practical soware systems is by no means a solved problem,
and remains the subject of intense ongoing research. e verication of AI systems,
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however, raises a distinctive new set of challenges. e present paper is concerned
with the problem of verifying multi-agent systems, which are AI systems consisting of
multiple interacting semi-autonomous soware components known as agents [76, 69].
Soware agents were originally proposed in the late 1980s, but it is only over the past
decade that the soware agent paradigm has been widely adopted. At the time of
writing, soware agents are ubiquitous: we have soware agents in our phone (e.g.,
Siri), processing requests online, automatically trading in global markets, controlling
complex navigation systems (e.g., those in self-driving cars), and even carrying out
tasks on our behalf in our homes (e.g., Alexa). Typically, these agents do not work in
isolation: they may interact with humans or with other soware agents. e eld of
multi-agent systems is concerned with understanding and engineering systems that
have these characteristics.
We typically assume that agents are acting in pursuit of goals or preferences that
are delegated to them by their users. However, whether an agent is able to achieve
its goal, or the extent to which it can bring about its preferences, will be directly
inuenced by the behaviour of other agents. us, to act optimally, an agent must
reason strategically, taking into account the goals/preferences of other agents, and the
fact that they too will be acting strategically in the pursuit of these, taking into account
the goals/preferences of other agents and their own strategic behaviour. Game theory
is the mathematical theory of strategic interaction, and as such, it provides a natural
set of tools for reasoning about multi-agent systems [65].
With respect to the problem of verifying multi-agent systems, the relevance of
game theory is as follows. Suppose we are interested in whether a multi-agent sys-
tem S , populated by self-interested agents, might exhibit some property represented
by an LTL formula ϕ. We can, of course, directly apply standard model checking tech-
niques, to determine whether ϕ holds on some or all computations of S . However,
given that our agents are assumed to act rationally, whether ϕ holds on some or all
computations is not relevant if the computations in question involve irrational choices
on behalf of some agents in the system. A much more relevant question, therefore, is
whetherϕ holds on some or all computations that could result from agents in the system
making rational choices. is raises the question of what counts as a rational choice by
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the agents in the system, and for this game theory provides a number of answers, in
the form of solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium [65, 69]. us, from the point
of view of game theory, correct behaviour would correspond to rational behaviour ac-
cording to some game theoretic solution concept, which is another way of saying that
agents in the system will act optimally with respect to their preferences/goals, under
the assumption that other agents do the same.
is approach to reasoning about the behaviour of multi-agent AI systems es-
tablishes a natural connection between multi-agent systems and multi-player games:
agents correspond to players, computations of the multi-agent system correspond to
plays of the game, individual agent behaviours correspond to player strategies (which
dene how players make choices in the system over time), and correct behaviour
would correspond to rational behaviour—in our case, player behaviour that is con-
sistent with the set of Nash equilibria of the multi-player game, whenever such a
set is non-empty. Our main interest in this paper is the development of the theory,
algorithms, and tools for the automated game theoretic analysis of concurrent and
multi-agent systems, and in particular, the analysis of temporal logic properties that
will hold in a multi-agent system under the assumption that players choose strategies
which form a Nash equilibrium1.
e connection between AI systems (modelled as multi-agent systems) and multi-
player games is well-established, but one may still wonder why correct behaviour for
the AI system should correspond to rational behaviour in the multi-player game. is
is a legitimate question, especially, because game theory oers very many dierent
notions of rationality, and therefore of optimal behaviour in the system/game. For
instance, solution concepts such as subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and
strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) are renements of Nash equilibrium where the no-
tion of rationality needs to satisfy stronger requirements. Consequently, there may
be executions of a multi-agent system that would correspond to a Nash equilibrium of
the associated multi-player game (thus, regarded as correct behaviours of the multi-
1Although in this work we focus on Nash equilibrium, a similar methodology may be applied using
renements of Nash equilibrium and other solution concepts.
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agent system), but which do not correspond to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
or to a strong Nash equilibrium of the associated multi-player game. We do not argue
that Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept of relevance in the game theoretic
analysis of multi-agent systems, but we believe (as do many others [69, 48, 3]) that
Nash equilibrium is a natural and appropriate starting point for such an analysis. Tak-
ing Nash equilibrium as our baseline notion of rationality in multi-player games, and
therefore of correctness in multi-agent systems, we focus our study on two problems
related to the temporal equilibrium analysis of multi-agent systems [42, 77], as we
now explain.
Synthesis and Rational Verication. e two main problems of interest to us are the
rational verication and automated synthesis problems for concurrent and multi-agent
systems modelled as multi-player games. In the rational verication problem, we de-
sire to check which temporal logic properties are satised by the system/game in
equilibrium, that is, temporal logic properties satised by executions of the multi-
agent system generated by strategies that form a Nash equilibrium. A lile more for-
mally, let P1, . . . , Pn be the agents in our concurrent and multi-agent system, and let
NE(P1, . . . , Pn) denote the set of all executions, hereaer called runs, of the system
that could be generated by agents selecting strategies that form a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, let ϕ be an LTL formula. en, in the rational verication problem, we want
to know whether for some/every run pi ∈ NE(P1, . . . , Pn) we have pi |= ϕ.
In the automated synthesis problem, on the other hand, we additionally desire to
construct a prole of strategies for players so that the resulting prole is an equilib-
rium of the multi-player game, and induces a run that satises a given property of
interest, again expressed as a temporal logic formula. at is, we are given the system
P1, . . . , Pn, and a temporal logic property ϕ, and we are asked to compute Nash equi-
librium strategies ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), one for each player in the game, that would result
in ϕ being satised in the run pi(~σ) that would be generated when these strategies are
enacted.
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Our Approach. In this paper, we present a new approach to the rational verica-
tion and automated synthesis problems for concurrent and multi-agent systems. In
particular, we develop a novel technique that can be used for both rational veri-
cation and automated synthesis using a reduction to the solution of a collection of
parity games. e technique can be eciently implemented making use of power-
ful techniques for parity games and temporal logic synthesis and verication, and has
been deployed in the Equilibrium Verication Environment (EVE [1]), which supports
high-level descriptions of systems/games using the Simple Reactive Modules Language
(SRML [74, 42]) and temporal logic specications given by Linear Temporal Logic for-
mulae [68].
e central decision problem that we consider is that of Non-Emptiness, the prob-
lem of checking if the set of Nash equilibria in a multi-player game is empty; as we will
later show, rational verication and synthesis can be reduced to this problem. If we
consider concurrent and multi-player games in which players have goals expressed
as temporal logic formulae, this problem is known to be 2EXPTIME-complete for a
wide range of system representations and temporal logic languages. For instance, for
games with perfect information played on labelled graphs, the problem is 2EXPTIME-
complete when goals are given as LTL formulae [64], and 2EXPTIME-hard when goals
are given in CTL [43]. e problem is 2EXPTIME-complete even if succinct represen-
tations [32, 41] or only two-player games [23] are considered, and becomes undecid-
able if imperfect information and more than two players are allowed [47], showing
the very high complexity of solving this problem, from both practical and theoretical
viewpoints.
A common feature of the results above mentioned is that—modulo minor variations—
their solutions are, in the end, reduced to the construction of an alternating parity
automaton over innite trees (APT [59]) which are then checked for non-emptiness.
Here, we present a novel, simpler, and more direct technique for checking the ex-
istence of Nash equilibria in games where players have goals expressed in LTL. In
particular, our technique does not rely on the solution of an APT. Instead, we reduce
the problem to the solution of (a collection of) parity games [29], which are widely
used for synthesis and verication problems.
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Formally, a parity game is a two-player zero-sum turn-based game given by a
labelled nite graph H = (V0, V1, E, α) such that V = V0 ∪ V1 is a set of states
partitioned into Player 0 (V0) and Player 1 (V1) states, respectively, E ⊆ V × V is
a set of edges/transitions, and α : V → N is a labelling priority function. Player 0
wins if the smallest priority that occurs innitely oen in the innite play is even.
Otherwise, player 1 wins. It is known that solving a parity game (checking which
player has a winning strategy) is in NP ∩ coNP [51], and can be solved in quasi-
polynomial time [18] 2.
Our technique uses parity games in the following way. We take as input a gameG
(representing a concurrent and multi-agent system) and build a parity gameH whose
sets of states and transitions are doubly exponential in the size of the input but with
priority function only exponential in the size of the input game. Using a determin-
istic Stree automaton on innite words (DSW [52]), we then solve the parity game,
leading to a decision procedure that is, overall, in 2EXPTIME, and, therefore, given
the hardness results we mentioned above, essentially optimal.
Context. Games have several dimensions: for example, they may be cooperative or
non-cooperative; have perfect or imperfect information; have perfect or imperfect
recall; be stochastic or not; amongst many other features. Each of these aspects will
have a modelling and computational impact on the work to be developed, and so it is
important to be precise about the nature of the games we are studying, and therefore
the assumptions underpinning our approach.
Our framework considers non-cooperative multi-player general-sum games with
perfect information, with Nash equilibrium as the main game-theoretic solution con-
cept. e games are played on nite structures (state-transition structures induced
by high-level SRML descriptions), with players having goals (preferences over plays)
given by LTL formulae and deterministic strategies represented by nite-state ma-
chines with output (Moore machines, sometimes referred to as transducers). Because
2Despite more than 30 years of research, and promising practical performance for algorithms to solve
them, it remains unknown whether parity games can be solved in polynomial time.
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of the features of our framework – chiey, the fact that players have LTL goals and
games are played on nite structures – considering deterministic strategies modelled
as nite-state machines does not represent a restriction: in our framework, anything
that a player can achieve with a perfect-recall strategy can also be achieved with a
nite-state machine strategy (see, e.g., [41] for the formal results).
Finally, we note that our games have equilibria that are bisimulation invariant: that
is, bisimilar structures have the same set of Nash equilibria. is is a highly desirable
property, and to the best of our knowledge, in this respect our work is unique in the
computer science and multi-agent systems literatures.
e EVE System. e technique outlined above and described in detail in this pa-
per has been successfully implemented in the Equilibrium Verication Environment
(EVE) system [45]. EVE takes as input a model of a concurrent and multi-agent
system, in which agents are specied using the Simple Reactive Modules Language
(SRML) [74, 42], and preferences for agents are dened by associating with each agent
a goal, represented as a formula of LTL [68]. Note that we believe our choice of the
Reactive Modules language is a very natural one [6]: e language is both widely used
in practical model checking systems, such as MOCHA [9] and PRISM [56], and close
to real-world (declarative) programming models and specication languages.
Now, given a specication of a multi-agent system and player preferences, the
EVE system can: (i) check for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player
game; (ii) check whether a given LTL formula is satised on some or every Nash
equilibrium of the system; and (iii) synthesise individual player strategies in the game.
As we will show in the paper, EVE performs favourably compared with other existing
tools that support rational verication. Moreover, EVE is the rst and only tool for
automated temporal equilibrium analysis for a model of multi-player games where
Nash equilibria are preserved under bisimilarity3.
Note that our approach may be used to model a wide range of multi-agent systems.
3Other tools to compute Nash equilibria exist, but they do not use our model of strategies. A comparison
with those other techniques for equilibrium analysis are discussed later.
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For example, as shown in [42], it is easy to capture multi-agent STRIPS systems [15].
Structure of the paper. e remainder of this article is structured as follows.
• Section 2 presents the relevant background on games, logic, and automata.
• In Section 3, we formalise the main problem of interest and give a high-level
description of the core decision procedure for temporal equilibrium analysis
developed in this paper.
• In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we describe in detail our main decision procedure for
temporal equilibrium analysis, prove its correctness, and show that it is essen-
tially optimal with respect to computational complexity.
• In Section 7, we show how to use our main decision procedure to do rational
verication and automated synthesis of logic-based multi-player games.
• In Section 8, we describe the EVE system, and give detailed experimental results
which demonstrate that EVE performs favourably in comparison with other
tools that support rational verication.
• In Section 9, we conclude, discuss relevant related work, and propose some
avenues for future work.
e source code for EVE is available online4, and the system can also be accessed via
the web5.
2. Preliminaries
Games. A concurrent (multi-player) game structure (CGS) is a tuple
M = (N, (Aci)i∈N,St, s0, tr)
where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players, each Aci is a set of actions, St is a set
of states, with a designated initial state s0. With each player i ∈ N and each state
4See https://github.com/eve-mas/eve-parity
5See http://eve.cs.ox.ac.uk/
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s ∈ St, we associate a non-empty set Aci(s) of available actions that, intuitively, i
can perform when in state s. We refer to a prole of actions~a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ ~Ac =
Ac1 × · · · ×Acn as a direction. A direction ~a is available in state s if for all i we have
ai ∈ Aci(s). Write ~Ac(s) for the set of available directions in state s. For a given set
of players A ⊆ N and an action prole ~a, we let ~aA and ~a−A be two tuples of actions,
respectively, one for each player in A and one for each player in N \A. We also write
~ai for ~a{i} and ~a−i for ~aN\{i}. Furthermore, for two directions ~a and ~a′, we write
(~aA,~a
′
−A) to denote the direction where the actions for players in A are taken from
~a and the actions for players in N \ A are taken from ~a′. Finally, tr is a deterministic
transition function, which associate each state s and every available direction ~a in s a
state s′ ∈ St.
Whenever there is ~a such that tr(s,~a) = s′, we say that s′ is accessible from s. A
path pi = s0, s1, . . . ∈ Stω is an innite sequence of states such that, for every k ∈ N,
sk+1 is accessible from sk . By pik we refer to the (k + 1)-th state in pi and by pi≤k to
the (nite) prex of pi up to the (k+ 1)-th element. An action prole run is an innite
sequence η = ~a0,~a1, . . . of action proles. Note that, sinceM is deterministic (i.e.,
the transition function tr is deterministic), for a given state s0, an action prole run
uniquely determines the path pi in which, for every k ∈ N, pik+1 = tr(pik,~ak).
A CGS is a type of concurrent system. As such, behaviourally equivalent CGSs
should give rise to strategically equivalent games. However, that is not always the
case. A comprehensive study of this issue can be found in [38, 39] where the strate-
gic power of games is compared using one of the most important behavioural (also
called observational) equivalences in concurrency, namely bisimilarity, which is usu-
ally dened over Kripke structures or labelled transition systems (see, e.g., [63, 49]).
However, the equivalence can be uniformly dened for general CGSs, where direc-
tions play the role of, for instance, actions in transition systems. Formally, let M =
(N, (Aci)i∈N,St, s0, tr) and M ′ = (N, (Aci)i∈N,St′, s′0, tr′) be two CGSs, and λ :
St → AP and λ′ : St′ → AP be two labelling functions over a set of propositional
variables AP. A bisimulation, denoted by ∼, between states s∗ ∈ St and t∗ ∈ St′ is
a non-empty binary relation R ⊆ St × St′, such that s∗ R t∗ and for all s, s′ ∈ St,
t, t′ ∈ St′, and ~a ∈ ~Ac:
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• s R t implies λ(s) = λ′(t),
• s R t and tr(s,~a) = s′ implies tr(t,~a) = t′′ for some t′′ ∈ St′ with s′ R t′′,
• s R t and tr(t,~a) = t′ implies tr(s,~a) = s′′ for some s′′ ∈ St with s′′ R t′.
en, if there is a bisimulation between two states s∗ and t∗, we say that they are
bisimilar and write s∗ ∼ t∗ in such a case. We also say that CGSs M and M ′ are
bisimilar (in symbols M ∼ M ′) if s0 ∼ s′0. Bisimilar structures satisfy the same set
of temporal logic properties, a desirable property that will be relevant later.
A CGS denes the dynamic structure of a game, but lacks a central aspect of games
in the sense of game theory: preferences, which give games their strategic structure.
A multi-player game is obtained from a structureM by associating each player with a
goal. In this paper, we consider multi-player games with parity and Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) goals.
LTL [68] extends classical propositional logic with two operators, X (“next”) and
U (“until”), that can be used to express properties of paths. e syntax of LTL is
dened with respect to a set AP of propositional variables as follows:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | ϕUϕ
where p ∈ AP. e remaining classical logical connectives are dened in terms of
¬ and ∨ in the usual way. Two key derived LTL operators are F (“eventually”) and
G (“always”), which are dened in terms of U as follows: Fϕ = >Uϕ and Gϕ =
¬F¬ϕ.
We interpret formulae of LTL with respect to tuples (pi, t, λ), where pi is a path
over some multi-player game, t ∈ N is a temporal index into pi, and λ : St → 2AP
is a labelling function, that indicates which propositional variables are true in every
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state. Formally, the semantics of LTL is given by the following rules:
(pi, t, λ) |= >
(pi, t, λ) |= p i p ∈ λ(pit)
(pi, t, λ) |= ¬ϕ i it is not the case that (pi, t, λ) |= ϕ
(pi, t, λ) |= ϕ ∨ ψ i (pi, t, λ) |= ϕ or (pi, t, λ) |= ψ
(pi, t, λ) |= Xϕ i (pi, t+ 1, λ) |= ϕ
(pi, t, λ) |= ϕUψ i for some t′ ≥ t : ((pi, t′, λ) |= ψ and
for all t ≤ t′′ < t′ : (pi, t′′, λ) |= ϕ).
If (pi, 0, λ) |= ϕ, we write pi |= ϕ and say that pi satises ϕ.
Denition 1. A (concurrent multi-player) LTL game is a tuple
GLTL = (M, λ, (γi)i∈N)
where λ : St → 2AP is a labelling function on the set of states St ofM, and each γi
is the goal of player i, given as an LTL formula over AP.
To dene multi-player games with parity goals we consider priority functions.
Let α : St → N be a priority function. A path pi satises α : St → N, and write
pi |= α in that case, if the minimum number occurring innitely oen in the innite
sequence α(pi0), α(pi1), α(pi2), . . . is even.
Observe that parity conditions are prex-independent, that is, for every path pi and
a nite sequence h ∈ St∗, it holds that h · pi |= α if and only if pi |= α.
Denition 2. A (concurrent multi-player) Parity game is a tuple
GPAR = (M, (αi)i∈N)
where αi : St→ N is the goal of player i, given as a priority function over St.
Hereaer, for statements regarding either LTL or Parity games6, we will simply
denote the underlying structure as G. Games are played by each player i selecting
6To simplify notations, note that , hereaer, by “Parity game” we denote the concurrent and multi-player
extension dened here of the well-known two-player turn-based parity games in the literature.
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a strategy σi that will dene how to make choices over time. Formally, for a given
game G, a strategy σi = (Si, s0i , δi, τi) for player i is a nite state machine with
output (a transducer), where Si is a nite and non-empty set of internal states, s0i is
the initial state, δi : Si × ~Ac → Si is a deterministic internal transition function,
and τi : Si → Aci an action function. Note that strategies are required to output
actions that are available to the agent in the current state. To enforce this, we assume
that the current state s ∈ St in the arena is encoded in the internal state si in Si
of agent i and that the action τi(si) taken by the action function belongs to Aci(s).
Let Σi be the set of strategies for player i. A strategy is memoryless in G from s if
Si = St, s0i = s, and δi = tr. Once every player i has selected a strategy σi, a strategy
prole ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) results and the game has an outcome, a path inM, which
we will denote by pi(~σ). Because strategies are deterministic, pi(~σ) is the unique path
induced by ~σ, that is, the innite sequence s0, s1, s2, . . . such that
• sk+1 = tr(sk, (τ1(sk1), · · · , τn(skn))), and
• sk+1i = δi(ski , (τ1(sk1), · · · , τn(skn))), for all k ≥ 0.
Note that the path induced by the strategy prole ~σ(σ1, . . . , σn) from state s0
corresponds to the one generated by the nite transducer T~σ obtained from the com-
position of the strategies σi’s in ~σ, with input set St and output set ~Ac, where the
initial input is s0. Since such transducer is nite, the generated path pi is ultimately
periodic, that is, there exists p, r ∈ N such that pik = pik+r for every p ≤ k. is means
that, aer the prex pi≤p, the path loops indenitely over the sequence pip+1 . . . pip+r .
Nash equilibrium. Since the outcome of a game determines if a player goal is sat-
ised, we can dene a preference relation i over outcomes for each player i. Let wi
be γi if G is an LTL game, and be αi if G is a Parity game. en, for two strategy
proles ~σ and ~σ′ in G, we have
pi(~σ) i pi(~σ′) if and only if pi(~σ′) |= wi implies pi(~σ) |= wi.
On this basis, we can dene the concept of Nash equilibrium [65] for a multi-player
game with LTL or parity goals: given a game G, a strategy prole ~σ is a Nash equilib-
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rium of G if, for every player i and strategy σ′i ∈ Σi, we have
pi(~σ) i pi((~σ−i, σ′i))
where (~σ−i, σ′i) denotes (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, . . . , σn), the strategy prole where
the strategy of player i in ~σ is replaced by σ′i. Let NE(G) denote the set of Nash
equilibria of G. In [38, 39] we showed that, using the model of strategies dened
above, the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved across bisimilar systems. is is
in contrast to other models of strategies considered in the concurrent games literature,
which do not preserve Nash equilibria. Because of this, hereaer, we say that {Σi}i∈N
is a set of bisimulation-invariant strategies and that NE(G) is the set of bisimulation-
invariant Nash equilibrium proles of G.
Automata. A deterministic automaton on innite words is a tuple
A = (AP, Q, q0, ρ,F)
where Q is a nite set of states, ρ : Q × AP → Q is a transition function, q0 is
an initial state, and F is an acceptance condition. We mainly use parity and Stree
acceptance conditions. A parity condition F is a partition {F1, . . . , Fn} of Q, where
n is the index of the parity condition and any [1, n] 3 k is a priority. We use a priority
function α : Q → N that maps states to priorities such that α(q) = k if and only
if q ∈ Fk . For a run pi = q0, q1, q2 . . . , let inf (pi) denote the set of states occurring
innitely oen in the run:
inf (pi) = {q ∈ Q | q = qi for innitely many i’s}
A run pi is accepted by a deterministic parity word (DPW) automaton with condition
F if the minimum priority that occurs innitely oen is even, i.e., if the following
condition is satised:(
min
k∈[1,n]
(inf (pi) ∩ Fk 6= ∅)
)
mod 2 = 0.
A Stree condition F is a set of pairs {(E1, C1), . . . , (En, Cn)} where Ek ⊆ Q and
Ck ⊆ Q for all k ∈ [1, n]. A run pi is accepted by a deterministic Stree word (DSW)
automaton S with condition F if pi either visits Ek nitely many times or visits Ck
innitely oen, i.e., if for every k either inf (pi) ∩ Ek = ∅ or inf (pi) ∩ Ck 6= ∅.
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Figure 1: Example of a 4× 4 grid world.
Example. In order to illustrate the usage of our framework, consider the following
example. Suppose we have two robots/agents inhabiting a grid world (an abstraction
of some environment, e.g., a warehouse) with dimensions n× n. Initially, the agents
are located at some corners of the grid; e agents are each able to move around the
grid in directions north, south, east, and west. e goal of each agent is to reach the
opposite corner. For instance, if agent i’s initial position is (0, 0), then the goal is to
reach position (n−1, n−1). A number of obstacles may also appear on the grid. e
agents are not allowed to move into a coordinate occupied by an obstacle or outside
the grid world. To make it clearer, consider the conguration shown in Figure 1; a
(grey) lled square depicts an obstacle. Agent 1, depicted by , can only move west
to (2, 3), whereas agent 2, depicted by©, can only move east to (1, 0).
In this example we make the following assumptions: (1) at each timestep, each
agent has to make a move, that is, it cannot stay at the same position for two consec-
utive timesteps, and it can only move at most one step; (2) the goal of each agent is, as
stated previously, to eventually reach the opposite corner of her initial position. From
system design point of view, the question that may be asked is: can we synthesise a
strategy prole such that it induces a stable (Nash equilibrium) run and at the same
time ensures that the agents never crash into each other?
Checking the existence of such strategy prole is not trivial. For instance, the
conguration in Figure 1 does not admit any safe Nash equilibrium runs, that is, where
all agents get their goals achieved without crashing into each other. Player © can
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Figure 2: A 4× 4 grid world with safe Nash equilibrium.
reach (3, 3) without crashing into , since  can safely “wait” by moving back and
forth between (0, 3) and (1, 3) until © reaches (3, 3). However, there is no similar
safe “waiting zone” for© to get out of’s way. On the other hand, the conguration
in Figure 2, admits safe Nash equilibrium; © and  have safe waiting zones (0, 0)
and (1, 0), and (0, 3) and (1, 3), respectively. Clearly, such a reasoning is not always
straightforward, especially when the seing is more complex, and therefore, having
a tool to verify and synthesise such scenario is desirable. Later in Section 8.5 we will
discuss how to encode and check such systems using our tool.
3. A Decision Procedure using Parity Games
We are now in a position to formally state the Non-Emptiness problem:
Given: An LTL Game GLTL.
estion: Is it the case that NE(GLTL) 6= ∅?
As indicated before, we solve both verication and synthesis through a reduction
to the above problem. e technique we develop consists of three steps. First, we
build a Parity game GPAR from an input LTL game GLTL. en—using a characteri-
sation of Nash equilibrium (presented later) that separates players in the game into
those that achieve their goals in a Nash equilibrium (the “winners”,W ) and those that
do not achieve their goals (the “losers”, L)—for each set of players in the game, we
eliminate nodes and paths in GPAR which cannot be a part of a Nash equilibrium, thus
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producing a modied Parity game, G−LPAR. Finally, in the third step, we use Stree au-
tomata on innite words to check if the obtained Parity game witnesses the existence
of a Nash equilibrium. e overall algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1 which also
includes some comments pointing to the relevant Sections/eorems. e rst step
is contained in line 3, while the third step is in lines 12–14. e rest of the algorithm
is concerned with the second step. In the sections that follow, we will describe each
step of the algorithm and, in particular, what are and how to compute Punj(GPAR)
and G−LPAR, two key constructions used in our decision procedure.
Algorithm 1: Nash equilibrium via Parity games
1 Input: An LTL game GLTL = (N, (Aci)i∈N,St, s0, tr, λ, (γi)i∈N).
2 Output: “Yes” if NE(GLTL) 6= ∅; “No” otherwise.
3 GPAR ⇐= GLTL ; /* from Section 4 (Theorem 1) */
4 foreachW ⊆ N do
5 foreach j ∈ L = N \W do
6 Compute Punj(GPAR) ; /* from Section 5 (Theorem 2) */
7 end
8 Compute G−LPAR
9 foreach i ∈W do
10 Compute Ai and Si from G−LPAR
11 end
12 if L(×i∈W (Si)) 6= ∅ ; /* from Section 5 (Theorem 3) */
13 then
14 return “Yes”
15 end
16 end
17 return “No”
Complexity. e procedure presented above runs in doubly exponential time, match-
ing the optimal upper bound of the problem. In the rst step we obtain a doubly ex-
ponential blowup. e underlying structure M of the obtained Parity game GPAR
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is doubly exponential in the size of the goals of the input LTL game GLTL, but the
priority functions set (αi)i∈N is only (singly) exponential. en, in the second step,
reasoning takes only polynomial time in the size of the underlying concurrent game
structure of GPAR, but exponential time in both the number of players and the size of
the priority functions set. Finally, the third step takes only polynomial time, leading
to an overall 2EXPTIME complexity.
4. From LTL to Parity
We now describe how to realise line 3 of Algorithm 1, and in doing so we prove a
strong correspondence between the set of Nash equilibria of the input LTL game GLTL
and the set of Nash equilibria of its associated Parity game GPAR. is result al-
lows us to shi reasoning on the set of Nash equilibria of GLTL into reasoning on
the set of Nash equilibria of GPAR. e basic idea behind this step of the decision
procedure is to transform all LTL goals (γi)i∈N in GLTL into a collection of DPWs,
denoted by (Aγi)i∈N, that will be used to build the underlying CGS of GPAR. We
construct GPAR as follows.
In general, using the results in [70, 67], from any LTL formula ϕ over AP one can
build a DPW Aϕ = 〈2AP, Q, q0, ρ, α〉 such that, L(Aϕ) = {pi ∈ (2AP)ω : pi |= ϕ},
that is, the language accepted by Aϕ is exactly the set of words over 2AP that are
models of ϕ. e size of Q is doubly exponential in |ϕ| and the size of the range
of α is singly exponential in |ϕ|. Using this construction we can dene, for each LTL
goal γi, a DPW Aγi .
Denition 3. Let GLTL = (M, λ, (γi)i∈N) be an LTL game whose underlying CGS
is M = (N, (Aci)i∈N,St, s0, tr), and let Aγi = 〈2AP, Qi, q0i , ρi, αi〉 be the DPW
corresponding to player i’s goal γi in GLTL. e Parity game GPAR associated to GLTL is
GPAR = (M′, (α′i)i∈N), whereM′ = (N, (Aci)i∈N,St′, s′0, tr
′
) and (α′i)i∈N are as
follows:
• St′ = St××i∈NQi and s′0 = (s0, q01 , . . . , q0n);
• for each state (s, q1, . . . , qn) ∈ St′ and action prole ~a,
tr′((s, q1, . . . , qn),~a) = (tr(s,~a), ρ1(q1, λ(s)), . . . , ρn(qn, λ(s));
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• α′i(s, q1, . . . qn) = αi(qi).
Intuitively, the game GPAR is the product of the LTL game GLTL and the collec-
tion of parity (word) automata Aγi that recognise the models of each player’s goal.
Informally, the game executes in parallel the original LTL game together with the au-
tomata built on top of the LTL goals. At every step of the game, the rst component
of the product state follows the transition function of the original game GLTL, while
the “automata” components are updated according to the labelling of the current state
of GLTL. As a result, the execution in GPAR is made, component by component, by the
original execution, say pi, in the LTL game GLTL, paired with the unique runs of the
DPWs Aγi generated when reading the word λ(pi).
Observe that in the translation from GLTL to its associated GPAR the set of actions
for each player is unchanged. is, in turn, means that the set of strategies in both
GLTL and GPAR is the same, since for every state s ∈ St and action prole ~a, it follows
that ~a is available in s if and only if it is available in (s, q1, . . . , qn) ∈ St′, for all
(q1, . . . , qn) ∈×i∈NQi. Using this correspondence between strategies in GLTL and
strategies in GPAR, we can prove the following Lemma, which states an invariance
result between GLTL and GPAR with respect to the satisfaction of players’ goals.
Lemma 1 (Goals satisfaction invariance). Let GLTL be an LTL game and GPAR its
associated Parity game. en, for every strategy prole ~σ and player i, it is the case that
pi(~σ) |= γi in GLTL if and only if pi(~σ) |= αi in GPAR.
Proof. We prove the statement by double implication. To show the le to right im-
plication, assume that pi(~σ) |= γi in GLTL, for any player i ∈ N, and let pi denote the
innite path generated by ~σ in GLTL; thus, we have that λ(pi) |= γi. On the other
hand, let pi′ denote the innite path generated in GPAR by the same strategy prole ~σ.
Observe that the rst component of pi′ is exactly pi. Moreover, consider the (i+ 1)-th
component ρi of pi′. By the denition of GPAR, it holds that ρi is the run executed
by the automaton Aγi when the word λ(pi) is read. By the denition of the labelling
function of GPAR, it holds that the parity of pi′ according to α′i corresponds to the one
recognised by Aγi in ρi. us, since we know that λ(pi) |= γi, it follows that ρi is
accepting in Aγi and therefore pi′ |= αi, which implies that pi(~σ) |= αi in GPAR. For
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the other direction, observe that all implications used above are equivalences. Using
those equivalences one can reason backwards to prove the statement.
Using Lemma 1 we can then show that the set of Nash Equilibria for any LTL
game exactly corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria of its associated Parity game.
Formally, we have the following invariance result between games.
eorem 1 (Nash equilibrium invariance). Let GLTL be an LTL game and GPAR its
associated Parity game. en, NE(GLTL) = NE(GPAR).
Proof. e proof proceeds by double inclusion. First, assume that a strategy pro-
le ~σ ∈ NE(GLTL) is a Nash Equilibrium in GLTL and, by contradiction, it is not a Nash
Equilibrium in GPAR. Observe that, due to Lemma 1, we known that the set of players
that get their goals satised by pi(~σ) in GLTL (the “winners”,W ) is the same set of play-
ers that get their goals satised by pi(~σ) in GPAR. en, there is player j ∈ L = N\W
and a strategy σ′j such that pi((~σ−j , σ′j)) |= αj in GPAR. en, due to Lemma 1, we
have that pi((~σ−j , σ′j)) |= γj in GLTL and so σ′j would be a benecial deviation for
player j in GLTL too—a contradiction. On the other hand, for every ~σ ∈ NE(GPAR),
we can reason in a symmetric way and conclude that ~σ ∈ NE(GLTL).
5. Characterising Nash Equilibria
anks to eorem 1, we can focus our aention on Parity games, since a tech-
nique for solving such games will also provide a technique for solving their associated
LTL games. To do this we characterise the set of Nash equilibria in the Parity game
construction GPAR in our algorithm. e existence of Nash Equilibria in LTL games
can be characterised in terms of punishment strategies and memoryful reasoning [40].
We will show that a similar characterisation holds here in a parity games framework,
where only memoryless reasoning is required. To do this, we rst introduce the notion
of punishment strategies and regions formally, as well as some useful denitions and
notations. In what follows, given a (memoryless) strategy prole ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
dened on a state s ∈ St of a Parity game GPAR, that is, such that s0i = s for every
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i ∈ N, we write GPAR, ~σ, s |= αi if pi(~σ) |= αi in GPAR. Moreover, if s = s0 is the
initial state of the game, we omit it and simply write GPAR, ~σ |= αi in such a case.
Denition 4 (Punishment strategies and regions). For a Parity game GPAR and a
player i ∈ N, we say that ~σ−i is a punishment (partial) strategy prole against i in a
state s if, for all strategies σ′i ∈ Σi, it is the case that GPAR, (~σ−i, σ′i), s 6|= αi. A state
s is punishing for i if there exists a punishment (partial) strategy prole against i in s.
By Puni(GPAR) we denote the set of punishing states, the punishment region, for i in
GPAR.
To understand the meaning of a punishment (partial) strategy prole, it is useful
to think of a modication of the game GPAR, in which player i still has its goal αi,
while the rest of the players are collectively playing in an adversarial mode, i.e., try-
ing to make sure that i does not achieve αi. is scenario is represented by a two-
player zero-sum game in which the winning strategies of the (coalition) player, de-
noted by −i, correspond (one-to-one) to the punishment strategies in the original
game GPAR. As described in [40], knowing the set of punishment (partial) strategy
proles in a given game is important to compute its set of Nash Equilibria. For this
reason, it is useful to compute the set Puni(GPAR), that is, the set of states in the
game from which a given player i can be punished. (e.g., to deter undesirable unilat-
eral player deviations). To do this, we reduce the problem to computing a winning
strategy in a turn-based two-player zero-sum parity game, whose denition is as fol-
lows.
Denition 5. For a (concurrent multi-player) Parity game
GPAR = (N,St, (Aci)i∈N, s0, tr, (αi)i∈N)
and player j ∈ N, the sequentialisation of GPAR with respect to player j is the (turn-
based two-player) parity game GjPAR =〈V0, V1,E , α〉 where
• V0 = St and V1 = St× ~Ac−j ;
• E = {(s, (s,~a−j)) ∈ St× (St× ~Ac−j)}∪{((s,~a−j), s′) ∈ (St× ~Ac−j)×St :
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s1 s2(~a−j , aj) s1 (s1,~a−j) s2
Figure 3: Sequentialisation of a game. On the le, a representation of a transition from s1 to s2 using
action prole (~a−j , aj). On the right, the two states s1 and s2 are assigned to Player 0 in the parity game,
which are interleaved with a state of Player 1 corresponding to the choice of ~a−j by coalition −j in the
original game.
∃a′j ∈ Acj . s′ = tr(s, (~a−j), a′j)};
• α : V0 ∪ V1 → N is such that
α(s) = αj(s) + 1 and α(s,~a−j) = αj(s) + 1.
e formal connection between the notion of punishment in GPAR and the set
of winning strategies in GjPAR is established in the following theorem, where by
Win(GjPAR) we denote the winning region of Player 0 in GjPAR, that is, the states
from which Player 0, representing the set of players −j = N \ {j} (the coalition of
players not including j), has a memoryless winning strategy against player j in the
two-player zero-sum parity game GjPAR.
eorem 2. For all states s ∈ St, it is the case that s ∈ Punj(GPAR) if and only if
s ∈Win(GjPAR). In other words, it holds that Punj(GPAR) = Win(GjPAR) ∩ St.
Proof. e proof goes by double inclusion. From le to right, assume s ∈ Punj(GPAR)
and let ~σ−j be a punishment strategy prole against player j in s, i.e., such that
GPAR, (~σ−j , σ′j), s 6|= αj , for every strategy σ′j ∈ Σj of player j. We now dene a
strategy σ0 for player 0 in GjPAR that is winning in s. In order to do this, rst observe
that, for every nite path pi′≤k ∈ V ∗ · V0 in GjPAR starting from s, there is a unique
nite sequence of action proles ~a0−j , . . . ,~ak−j and a sequence pi≤k = s0, . . . , sk+1 of
states in St∗ such that
pi′≤k = s
0, (s0,~a0−j), . . . , s
k, (sk,~ak−j), . . . , s
k+1 .
Now, for every path pi′≤k of this form that is consistent with ~σ−j , i.e., the sequence
~a0−j , . . . ,~a
k−1
−j is generated by ~σ−j , dene σ0(pi′≤k) = (sk+1,~a
k+1
−j ), where ~a
k+1
−j is
the action prole selected by ~σ−j . To prove that σ0 is winning, consider a strategy
σ1 for Player 1 and the innite path pi′ = pi((σ0, σ1)) generated by (σ0, σ1). It is
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not hard to see that the sequence pi′odd of odd positions in pi′ belongs to a path pi in
GPAR and it is consistent with ~σ−j . us, since ~σ−j is a punishment strategy, pi′odd
does not satisfy αj . Moreover, observe that the parity of the sequence pi′even of even
positions equals that of pi′odd. us, we have that Inf(λ′(pi′)) + 1 = Inf(λ′(pi′odd)) +
1 ∪ Inf(λ′(pi′even)) + 1 = Inf(λ(pi)) and so pi′ is winning for player 0 in GjPAR and σ0
is a winning strategy.
From right to le, let s ∈ St ∩ Win(GjPAR) and let σ0 be a winning strat-
egy for Player 0 in GjPAR, and assume σ0 is memoryless. Now, for every player i,
with i 6= j, dene the memoryless strategy σi in GPAR such that, for every s′ ∈ St,
if σ0(s′) = (s′,~a−j), then σi(s′) = (~a−j)i 7, i.e., the action that player i takes in
σ0 at s′. Now, consider the (memoryless) strategy prole ~σ−j given by the com-
position of all strategies σi, and consider a play pi in GPAR, starting from s, that
is consistent with ~σ−j . us, there exists a play pi′ in GiPAR, consistent with σ0,
such that pi = pi′odd. Moreover, since pi′odd = pi′even, we have that Inf(λ′(pi′)) =
Inf(λ′(pi′odd)) ∪ Inf(λ′(pi′even)) = Inf(λ(pi))− 1. Since pi′ is winning for Player 0, we
know that pi 6|= αj and so ~σ−j is a punishment strategy against Player j in s.
Denition 5 and eorem 2 not only make a bridge from the notion of punish-
ment strategy to the notion of winning strategy for two-player zero-sum games, but
also provide a way to understand how to compute punishment regions as well as
how to synthesise an actual punishment strategy in Parity games. In this way, by
computing winning regions and winning strategies in these games we can solve the
synthesis problem for individual players in the original game with LTL goals, one of
the problems we are interested in. us, from Denition 5 and eorem 2, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Computing Puni(GPAR) can be done in polynomial time with respect
to the size of the underlying graph of the game GPAR and exponential in the size of the
priority functionαi, that is, to the size of the range ofαi. Moreover, there is a memoryless
strategy ~σi that is a punishment against player i in every state s ∈ Puni(GPAR).
7By an abuse of notation, we let σi(s′) be the value of τi(s′).
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Figure 4: Representation of the strategy σi. At the beginning, player i follows the transducer
Tη that generates the action prole run η. e strategy adheres to it until a unilateral deviation
from player j occurs, here represented at the k-th step of the play. Once the deviation has
occurred, and the game entered a state s′, player i starts executing the strategy σpunji , to employ
the punishment strategy against player j.
As described in [40], in any (innite) run sustained by a Nash equilibrium ~σ in
deterministic and pure strategies, that is, in pi(~σ), it is the case that all players that
do not get their goals achieved in pi(~σ) can deviate from such a (Nash equilibrium)
run only to states where they can be punished by the coalition consisting of all other
players in the game. To formalise this idea in the present seing, we need one more
concept about punishments, dened next.
Denition 6. An action prole run η = ~a0,~a1, . . . ∈ ~Ac
ω
is punishing-secure in s for
player j if, for all k ∈ N and a′j , we have tr(pij , ((~ak)−j , a′j)) ∈ Punj(GPAR), where
pi is the only play in GPAR starting from s and generated by η.
Using the above denition, we can characterise the set of Nash equilibria of a
given game. Recall that strategies are formalised as transducers, i.e., as nite state
machines with output, so such Nash equilibria strategy proles produce runs which
are ultimately periodic. Moreover, since in every run pi there are players who get their
goals achieved in pi (and therefore do not have an incentive to deviate from pi) and
players who do not get their goals achieve in pi (and therefore may have an incentive
to deviate from pi), we will also want to explicitly refer to such players. To do that, the
following notation will be useful: LetW (GPAR, ~σ) = {i ∈ N : GPAR, ~σ |= αi} denote
the set of player that get their goals achieved in pi(~σ). We also write W (GPAR, pi) =
{i ∈ N : GPAR, pi |= αi}.
eorem 3 (Nash equilibrium characterisation). For a Parity game GPAR, there is a
Nash Equilibrium strategy prole ~σ ∈ NE(GPAR) if and only if there is an ultimately
24
periodic action prole run η such that, for every player j ∈ L = N \W (GPAR, pi), the
run η is punishing-secure for j in state s0, where pi is the unique path generated by η
from s0.
Proof. e proof is by double implication. From le to right, for ~σ ∈ NE(GPAR), let
η be the ultimately periodic sequence of action proles generated by ~σ. Moreover,
assume for a contradiction that η is not punishing-secure for some j ∈ L. By the
denition of punishment-secure, there is k ∈ N and action a′j ∈ Acj for player j
such that s′ = tr(pik, ((~ak)−j , a′j) /∈ Punj(GPAR). Now, consider the strategy σ′j that
follows η up to the (k−1)-th step, executes action a′j on step k to get into state s′, and
applies a strategy that achieves αj from that point onwards. Note that such a strategy
is guaranteed to exist since s′ /∈ Punj(GPAR). erefore, GPAR, (~σ−j , σ′j) |= αj
and so σ′j is a benecial deviation for player j, a contradiction to ~σ being a Nash
equilibrium.
From right to le, we need to dene a Nash equilibrium ~σ assuming only the
existence of η. First, recall that η can be generated by a nite transducer Tη =
(Qη, q
0
η, δη, τη) where δη : Qη → Qη and τη : Qη → ~Ac. Moreover, for every
player i and deviating player j, with i 6= j, there is a (memoryless) strategy σpunji to
punish player j in every state in Punj(GPAR). By suitably combining the transducer
with the punishment strategies, we dene the following strategy σi = (Qi, q0i , δi, τi)
for player i where
• Qi = St×Qη × (L ∪ {>}) and q0i = (s0, q0η,>);
• δi = Qi × ~Ac→ Qi is dened as
δi((s, q,>),~a) =

(tr(s,~a), δη(q),>), if a = τη(q)
(tr(s,~a), δη(q), j), a−j = (τη(q))−j and ~aj 6= (τη(q))j
⊥, otherwise
8
• τi : Qi → Aci is such that
8For completeness, the function δi is assumed to take an available action. However, this is not important,
as it is clear from the proof we never use this case.
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– τi(s, q,>) = (τη(q))i, and
– τi(s, q, j) = σpunji (s).
To understand how strategy σi works, observe that its set of internal states is given
by the following triple. e rst component is a state of the game, remembering
the position of the execution. e second component is a state of the transducer
Tη , which is used to employ the execution of the action prole run η. e third
component is either the symbol >, used to ag that no deviation has occurred, or the
name of a losing player j, used to remember that such a player has deviated from η.
At the beginning of the play, strategy σi starts executing the actions prescribed by
the transducer Tη . It sticks to it until some losing player j performs a deviation. In
such a case, the third component of the internal state of σi switches to remember the
deviating player. Moreover, from that point on, it starts executing the punishment
strategy σpunji . Recall that parity conditions are prex-independent. erefore, no
maer the result of the execution, if all the players start playing according to the
punishment strategy σpunji , the resulting path will not satisfy the parity condition
αj . Now, dene σ to be the collection of all σi. It remains to prove that ~σ is a Nash
Equilibrium.
First, observe that since~σ produces exactly η, we haveW (GPAR, ~σ) = W (GPAR, η),
that is, the players that get their goals achieved in pi(~σ) and η are the same. us,
only players in L could have a benecial deviation. Now, consider a player j ∈ L
and a strategy σ′j and let k ∈ N be the minimum (rst) step where σ′j produces
an outcome that diers from σj when executed along with ~σ−j . We write pi′ for
pi((~σ−j , σ′j)). us, we have pih = pi′h for all h ≤ k and pik+1 6= pi′k+1. Hence pi′k+1 =
tr(pi′k, (ηk)−j , a
′
j) = tr(pik, (ηk)−j , a
′
j) ∈ Punj(GPAR) and GPAR, (~σ−j , σ′j) 6|= αj ,
since σ−j is a punishment strategy from pi′k+1. us, there is no benecial deviation
for j and ~σ is a Nash equilibrium.
6. Computing Nash Equilibria
eorem 3 allows us to reduce the problem of nding a Nash equilibrium to nding
a path in the game satisfying certain properties, which we will show how to check
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using DPW and DSW automata. To do this, let us x a given set W ⊆ N of players
in a given game GPAR, which are assumed to get their goals achieved. Now, due to
eorem 3, we have that an action prole run η corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
with W being the set of “winners” in the game if, and only if, the following two
properties are satised:
• η is punishment-secure for j in s0, for all j ∈ L = N \W ;
• GPAR, pi |= αi, for every i ∈W ;
where pi is, as usual, the path generated by η from s0.
To check the existence of such η, we have to check these two properties. First,
note that, for η to be punishment-secure for every losing player j ∈ L, the game
has to remain in the punishment region of each j. is means that an acceptable
action prole run needs to generate a path that is, at every step, contained in the
intersection
⋂
j∈L Punj(GPAR). us, to nd a Nash equilibrium, we can remove all
states not in such an intersection. We also need to remove some edges from the game.
Indeed, consider a state s and a partial action prole ~a−j . It might be the case that
tr(s, (~a−j , a′j)) /∈ Punj(GPAR), for some a′j ∈ Acj . erefore, an action prole run
that executes the partial prole ~a−j over s cannot be punishment-secure, and so all
outgoing edges from (s,~a−j), can also be removed. Aer doing this for every j ∈ L,
we obtain G−LPAR, the game resulting from GPAR aer the removal of the states and
edges just described. As a consequence, G−LPAR has all and only the paths that can be
generated by an action prole run that is punishment-secure for every j ∈ L.
e only thing that remains to be done is to check whether there exists a path in
G−LPAR that satises all players in W . To do this, we use DPW and DSW automata.
Since players goals are parity conditions, a path satisfying player i is an accepting
run of the DPW Ai where the set of states and transitions are exactly those of G−LPAR
and the acceptance condition is given by αi. en, in order to nd a path satisfying
the goals of all players in W , we can solve the emptiness problem of the automaton
intersection×i∈W Ai. However, observe that eachAi diers from each other only in
its acceptance condition αi. Moreover, each parity conditionα = (F1, . . . , Fn) can be
regarded as a Street condition of the form ((E1, C1), . . . , (Em, Cm)) with m = dn2 e
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and (Ei, Ci) = (F2i+1,
⋃
j≤i F2j), for every 0 ≤ i < m. erefore, the intersection
language of×i∈W Ai can be recognized by a Street automaton over the same set of
states and transitions and the concatenation of all the Stree conditions determined
by the parity conditions of the players in W . e overall translation is a DSW au-
tomaton with a number of Stree pairs being logarithmic in the number of its states,
whose emptiness can be solved in polynomial time [66]. Finally, as we xed W at the
beginning, all we need to do is to use the procedure just described for each W ⊆ N, if
needed (see Algorithm 1). 9
Concerning the complexity analysis, consider again Algorithm 1 and denote by
n the number of agents and |StLTL| the number of states. Observe that Line 3 of the
algorithm builds a Parity game GPAR by making the product construction between
GLTL and all the DPW automata Aγi , whose state space is 22
|γi| , and the number of
priorities is 2|γi|. us, the number of states of GPAR is |StPAR| = |StLTL| ·22|γ1| · . . . ·
22
|γn| . Now, on the one hand, Line 6 requires to solve a parity game on the state-graph
of GPAR with 2γi priorities. is is solved by applying Zielonka’s algorithm [79], that
works in time (|StPAR|)2 · (|StPAR|)2γi , thus polynomial in the state space of GPAR
and doubly exponential in the size of objectives γi’s. On the other hand, Line 12
calls for the Non-Emptiness procedure of a DSW whose number of Street pairs is
linear in the sum of priorities of the automataAγ , . . . ,Aγn and so logarithmic in its
state-space (that is doubly exponential in the size of the objectives). Such procedure
is polynomial in the state space of the automaton [66, Corollary 10.8] and therefore
polynomial in |StPAR|. Finally, consider the consider the loops of Line 4 and Line 5,
respectively. e rst is on all the possible subsets of agents, and thus of length 2n.
e second is on all the possible agents, and thus of length n. is sums up to an
overall complexity for Algorithm 1 of:
2n · n · ((|StPAR|)2 · (|StPAR|)
∑
i∈N 2
γi
+ |StPAR|).
Recall that |StPAR| is linear in the set of states of the GLTL and doubly exponential
9Some previous techniques, e.g. [14], to the computation of pure Nash equilibria are not optimal as they
have exponential space complexity in the number of players |N|.
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in every objective γi’s of the agents. us, the procedure is polynomial in |StLTL|,
exponential in N , and doubly exponential in the size of the formulas |γ1|, . . . , |γN |.
7. Synthesis and Verication
We now show how to solve the synthesis and verication problems using Non-
Emptiness. For synthesis, the solution is already contained in the proof of eorem 3,
so we only need to sketch out the approach here. Note that, in the computation of
punishing regions, the algorithm builds, for every player i and potential deviator j,
a (memoryless) strategy that player i can play in the collective strategy prole ~σ−j
in order to punish player j, should player j wishes to deviate. If a Nash equilibrium
exists, the algorithm also computes a (ultimately periodic) witness of it, that is, a
computation pi in G, that, in particular, satises the goals of players in W . At this
point, using this information, we are able to dene a strategy σi for each player i ∈ N
in the game (i.e., including those not inW ), as follows: while no deviation occurs, play
the action that contributes to generate pi, and if a deviation of player j occurs, then
play the (memoryless) strategy σpunji that is dened in the game to punish player j in
case j were to deviate. Notice, in addition, that because of Lemma 1 and eorem 1,
every strategy for player i in the game with parity goals is also a valid strategy for
player i in the game with LTL goals, and that such a strategy, being bisimulation-
invariant, is also a strategy for every possible bisimilar representation of player i. In
this way, our technique can also solve the synthesis problem for every player, that
is, can compute individual bisimulation-invariant strategies for every player (system
component) in the original multi-player game (concurrent system).
For verication, one can use a reduction of the following two problems, called
E-Nash and A-Nash in [41, 77, 42], to Non-Emptiness.
Given: Game GLTL, LTL formula ϕ.
E-Nash: Is it the case that pi(~σ) |= ϕ, for some ~σ ∈ NE(GLTL) ?
A-Nash: Is it the case that pi(~σ) |= ϕ, for all ~σ ∈ NE(GLTL) ?
We write (GLTL, ϕ) ∈ E-Nash to denote that (GLTL, ϕ) is an instance of E-Nash, i.e.,
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given a game GLTL and a LTL formula ϕ, the answer to E-Nash problem is a “yes”;
and, similarly for A-Nash.
Because we are working on a bisimulation-invariant seing, we can ensure some-
thing even stronger: that for any two games GLTL and G′LTL, whose underlying CGSs
areM andM′, respectively, we know that ifM is bisimilar toM′, then (GLTL, ϕ) ∈
E-Nash if and only if (G′LTL, ϕ) ∈ E-Nash, for all LTL formulae ϕ; and, similarly for
A-Nash, as desired.
In order to solve E-Nash and A-Nash via Non-Emptiness, one could use the
following result, whose proof is a simple adaptation of the same result for iterated
Boolean games [41] and for multi-player games with LTL goals modelled using SRML [42],
which was rst presented in [35].
Lemma 2. LetG be a game and ϕ be an LTL formula. ere is a gameH of linear size
in G, such that NE(H) 6= ∅ if and only if ∃~σ ∈ NE(G). pi(~σ) |= ϕ .
However, since we have Algorithm 1 at our disposal, an easier – and more direct
– solution can be obtained. To solve E-Nash we can modify line 12 of Algorithm 1
to include the restriction that such an algorithm, which now receives ϕ as a param-
eter, returns “Yes” in line 13 if and only if ϕ is satised in some run in the set of
Nash equilibrium witnesses. e new line 12 is “if L(×i∈W (Si) × Sϕ) 6= ∅”, where
Sϕ is the DSW automaton representing ϕ. All complexities remain the same; the
modied algorithm for E-Nash is denoted as Algorithm 1’. We can then use Algo-
rithm 1’ to solve A-Nash, also as described in [35]: essentially, we can check whether
Algorithm 1’(GLTL,¬ϕ) returns “No” in line 16. If it does, then no Nash equilibrium
of GLTL satises ¬ϕ, either because no Nash equilibrium exists at all (thus, A-Nash
is vacuously true) or because all Nash equilibria of GLTL satisfy ϕ, then solving A-
Nash positively. Note that in this case, since A-Nash is solved positively when the
algorithm returns “No” in line 16, then no specic Nash equilibrium strategy prole
is synthesised, as expected. However, if the algorithm returns “Yes”, that is, the case
when the answer to A-Nash problem with (GLTL, ϕ) instance is negative, then a strat-
egy prole is synthesised from Algorithm 1’ which corresponds to a counter-example
for (GLTL, ϕ) ∈ A-Nash. It should be easy to see that implementing E-Nash and A-
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Nash is straightforward from Algorithm 1. Also, as already known, it is also easy to
see that Algorithm 1’ solves Non-Emptiness if and only if (GLTL,>) ∈ E-Nash.
8. Implementation
We have implemented the decision procedures presented in this paper. Our im-
plementation uses SRML [74] as a modelling language. SRML is based on the Reac-
tive Modules language [6] which is used in a number of verication tools, including
PRISM [56] and MOCHA [9]. e tool that implements our algorithms is called EVE
(for Equilibrium Verication Environment) [45]. EVE is the rst and only tool able
to analyse the linear temporal logic properties that hold in equilibrium in a concur-
rent, reactive, and multi-agent system within a bisimulation-invariant framework. It
is also the only tool that supports all of the following combined features: a high-level
description language using SRML, general-sum multi-player games with LTL goals,
bisimulation-invariant strategies, and perfect recall. It is also the only tool for Nash
equilibrium analysis that relies on a procedure based on the solution of parity games,
which has allowed us to solve the (rational) synthesis problem for individual play-
ers in the system using very powerful techniques originally developed to solve the
synthesis problem from (linear-time) temporal logic specications.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other tools that can be used
to reason about temporal logic equilibrium properties of concurrent/multi-agent sys-
tems: PRALINE [16] and MCMAS [19, 20].
PRALINE allows one to compute a Nash equilibrium in a game played in a con-
current game structure [16]. e underlying technique uses alternating Bu¨chi au-
tomata and relies on the solution of a two-player zero-sum game called the ‘suspect
game’ [14]. PRALINE can be used to analyse games with dierent kinds of players
goals (e.g., reachability, safety, and others), but does not permit LTL goals, and does
not compute bisimulation-invariant strategies.
MCMAS is a model checking tool for multi-agent systems [60]. Since it can be
used to model check Strategy Logic (SL [64]) formulae [20], and SL can express the
existence of a Nash equilibrium, one can model a multi-agent system in MCMAS and
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check for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in such a system using SL. However,MC-
MAS only supports SL with memoryless strategies (while our implementation does
not have this restriction) and, as PRALINE, does not compute bisimulation-invariant
strategies either.
From the many dierences between PRALINE, MCMAS, and EVE (and their asso-
ciated underlying reasoning and verication techniques), one of the most important
ones is bisimulation-invariance, a feature needed to be able to do verication and syn-
thesis, e.g., when using symbolic methods with OBDDs or some model-minimisation
techniques. Not being bisimulation-invariant also means that in some cases PRALINE,
MCMAS, and EVE would deliver completely dierent answers. For instance, unlike
EVE, with PRALINE and MCMAS it may be the case that for two bisimilar systems
PRALINE and MCMAS would compute a Nash equilibrium in one of them and none
in the other. A particular instance is the “motivating example” in [38]. Since the two
systems there are bisimilar, EVE is able to compute a bisimulation-invariant Nash
equilibrium in both systems, while PRALINE and MCMAS, both of which are not us-
ing bisimulation-invariant model of strategies, cannot. e experiment supporting
this claim is reported in Section 8.4 along with the performance results. Indeed, even
in cases where all tools are able to compute a Nash equilibrium, EVE outperforms the
other two tools as the size of the input system grows, despite the fact that the model
of strategies we use in our procedure is richer in the sense that it takes into account
more information of the underlying game.10
8.1. Tool Description
Modelling Language. Systems in EVE are specied with the Simple Reactive Modules
Language (SRML [74]), that can be used to model non-deterministic systems. Each
system component (agent/player) in SRML is represented as a module, which con-
sists of an interface that denes the name of the module and lists a non-empty set of
Boolean variables controlled by the module, and a set of guarded commands, which de-
10As mentioned before, not all games can be tested in all tools since, for instance, PRALINE does not
support LTL objectives, but only goals expressed directly as Bu¨chi conditions.
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ne the choices available to the module at each state. ere are two kinds of guarded
commands: init, used for initialising the variables, and update, used for updating
variables subsequently.
A guarded command has two parts: a “condition” part (the “guard”) and an “ac-
tion” part. e “guard” determines whether a guarded command can be executed or
not given the current state, while the “action” part denes how to update the value
of (some of) the variables controlled by a corresponding module. Intuitively, ϕ ; α
can be read as “if the condition ϕ is satised, then one of the choices available to the
module is to execute α”. Note that the value of ϕ being true does not guarantee the
execution of α, but only that it is enabled for execution, and thus may be chosen. If
no guarded command of a module is enabled in some state, then that module has no
choice and the values of the variables controlled by it remain unchanged in the next
state.
Formally, an SRML module mi is dened as a triple mi = (Φi, Ii, Ui), where
Φi ⊆ Φ is the nite set of Boolean variables controlled by mi, Ii a nite set of init
guarded commands, such that for all g ∈ Ii, we have ctr(g) ⊆ Φi, and Ui a nite
set of update guarded commands, such that for all g ∈ Ui, we have ctr(g) ⊆ Φi. A
guarded command g over a set of variables Φ is an expression
g : ϕ; x′1 := ψ1; . . . ;x
′
k := ψk
where the guard ϕ is a propositional logic formula over Φ, each xi is a member of
Φ and ψi is a propositional logic formula over Φ. Let guard(g) denote the guard of
g, thus, in the above rule, we have guard(g) = ϕ. It is required that no variable xi
appears on the le hand side of more than one assignment statements in the same
guarded command, hence no issue on the (potentially) conicting updates arises. e
variables x1, . . . , xk are controlled variables in g ∈ Ui and we denote this set by
ctr(g). If no guarded command of a module is enabled, then the values of all variables
in ctr(g) are unchanged. A set of guarded commands is said to be disjoint if their
controlled variables are mutually disjoint. To make it clearer, here is an example of a
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module toggle controls x
init
:: >; x′ := >;
:: >; x′ := ⊥;
update
:: ¬x; x′ := >;
:: x; x′ := ⊥;
Figure 5: Example of module toggle in SRML.
guarded command:
(p ∧ q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard
; p′ := >; q′ := ⊥︸ ︷︷ ︸
action
e guard is the propositional logic formula (p∧ q), so this guarded command will be
enabled if both p and q are true. If the guarded command is chosen (to be executed),
then in the next time-step, variable p will be assigned true and variable q will be
assigned false.
Figure 5 shows a module named toggle that controls a Boolean variable named
x. ere are two init guarded commands and two update guarded commands. e
init guarded commands dene two choices for the initialisation of variable x: true or
false. e rst update guarded command says that if x has the value of true, then the
corresponding choice is to assign it to false, while the second command says that if x
has the value of false, then it can be assigned to true. Intuitively, the module would
choose (in a non-deterministic manner) an initial value for x, and then on subsequent
rounds toggles this value. In this particular example, the init commands are non-
deterministic, while the update commands are deterministic. We refer to [42] for
further details on the semantics of SRML. In particular, in Figure 12 of [42], we detail
how to build a Kripke structure that models the behaviour of an SRML system. In
addition, we associate each module with a goal, which is specied as an LTL formula.
At this point, readers might notice that the way SRML modules are dened leads
to the possibility of having multiple initial states – which appears to contradict the
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Figure 6: High-level workow of EVE.
denition of CMGS. However, this is not a problem, since we can always add an extra
“pre”-initial state whose outgoing edges are labelled according to init guarded com-
mands, and use it as the “real” initial state.
Automated Temporal Equilibrium Analysis. Once a multi-agent system is mod-
elled in SRML, it can be seen as a multi-player game in which players (the modules)
use strategies to resolve the non-deterministic choices in the system. EVE uses Algo-
rithm 1 to solve Non-Emptiness. e main idea behind this algorithm is illustrated
in Figure 6. e general ow of the implementation is as follows. Let GLTL be a game,
modelled using SRML, with a set of players/modules N = {1, . . . , n} and LTL goals
Γ = {γ1, . . . , γn}, one for each player. Using GLTL we construct an associated con-
current game with parity goals GPAR in order to shi reasoning on the set of Nash
equilibria of GLTL into the set of Nash equilibria of GPAR. e basic idea of this con-
struction is, rstly, to transform all LTL goals in GLTL into deterministic parity word
(DPW) automata. To do this, we use LTL2BA tool [36, 61] to transform the formulae
into nondeterministic Bu¨chi word (NBW) automata. From NBWs, we construct the
associated deterministic parity word (DPW) automata via construction described in
[67]. Secondly, to perform a product construction of the Kripke structure that repre-
sents GLTL with the collection of DPWs in which the set of Nash equilibria of the input
game is preserved. With GPAR in our hands, we can then reason about Nash equilibria
by solving a collection of parity games. To solve these parity games, we use PGSolver
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tool [34, 2]. EVE then iterates through all possible set of “winners” W ⊆ N (Algo-
rithm 1 line 4) and computes a punishment region Punj(GPAR) for each j ∈ L = N\W ,
with which a reduced parity game G−LPAR =
⋂
j∈L Punj(GPAR) is built. Notice that for
each player j, Punj(GPAR) need only computed once and can be stored, thus result-
ing in a more ecient running time. Lastly, EVE checks whether there exists a path
ρ in G−LPAR that satises the goals of each i ∈ W . To do this, we translate G−LPAR into a
deterministic Stree automata, whose language is empty if and only if so is the set
of Nash equilibria of GPAR. For E-Nash problem, we simply need to nd a run in the
witness returned when we check for Non-Emptiness; this can be done via automata
intersection11.
EVE was developed in Python and available online from [1]. EVE takes as input
a concurrent and multi-agent system described in SRML code, with player goals and
a property ϕ to be checked specied in LTL. For Non-Emptiness, EVE returns “YES”
(along with a set of winning players W ) if the set of Nash equilibria in the system is
not empty, and returns “NO” otherwise. For E-Nash (A-Nash), EVE returns “YES” if
ϕ holds on some (every) Nash equilibrium of the system, and “NO” otherwise.
In the next subsection, we present some case studies to evaluate the performance
of EVE. e case studies are based on distributed and concurrent systems that can nat-
urally be modelled as multi-agent systems. We note, however, that such case studies
bear no special relevance to multi-agent systems research. Instead, our only purpose
is to use such case studies and multi-agent systems to evaluate EVE’s performance,
rather than to solve problems of particular relevance in the AI or multi-agent sys-
tems literatures. Nevertheless, one could easily see that the case studies are based on
systems that one can imagine to be found in many AI systems nowadays.
8.2. Case Studies
In this section, we present two examples from the literature of concurrent and
distributed systems to illustrate the practical usage of EVE. Among other things, these
two examples dier in the way they are modelled as a concurrent game. While the
11For A-Nash is straightforward, since it is the dual of E-Nash.
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Figure 7: Gossip framework structure.
module RM1 controls s1
init
:: true ∼> s1’:=true;
update
:: s1 ∼> s1’:=false;
:: s1 ∼> s1’:=true;
:: !s1 and (!s2 or ... or !sn)
∼> s1’:=true;
goal
:: G F (!s1);
Figure 8: SRML machine readable code for mod-
ule RM1 as wrien in EVE’s input code.
rst one is played in an arena implicitly given by the specication of the players in the
game (as done in [42]), the second one is played on a graph, e.g., as done in [7] with
the use of concurrent game structures. Both of these models of games (modelling
approaches) can be used within our tool. We will also use these two examples to
evaluate EVE’s practical performance and compare it against MCMAS and PRALINE
in Section 8.3. Furthermore, since PRALINE and MCMAS use dierent modelling
languages – ISPL in the case of MCMAS – we need to translate the examples modelled
in SRML into PRALINE’s input language and ISPL. Given the high-level nature of
SRML, the translation might introduce exponential blowup. However, we argue that
this is not a problem from the comparison point of view, since the exponential blowup
is also unavoidable when building Kripke structures from SRML games.
Gossip protocols. ese are a class of networking and communication protocols that
mimic the way social networks disseminate information. ey have been used to
solve problems in many large-scale distributed systems, such as peer-to-peer and cloud
computing systems. Ladin et al. [57] developed a framework to provide high avail-
ability services via replication which is based on the gossip approach rst introduced
in [31, 78]. e main feature of this framework is the use of replica managers (RMs)
which exchange “gossip” messages periodically in order to keep the data updated. e
architecture of such an approach is shown in Figure 7.
We can model each RM as a module in SRML as follows: (1) When in servicing
mode, an RM can choose either to keep in servicing mode or to switch to gossiping
mode; (2) If it is in gossiping mode and there is at least another RM also in gossiping
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mode12, since the information during gossip exchange is of (small) bounded size, it
goes back to servicing mode in the subsequent step. We then set the goal of each RM
to be able to gossip innitely oen. As shown in Figure 8, the module RM1 controls
a variable: s1. Its value being true signies that RM1 is in servicing mode; other-
wise, it is in gossiping mode. Behaviour (1) is reected in the rst and second update
commands, while behaviour (2) is reected in the third update command. e goal of
RM1 is specied with the LTL formula GF ¬ s1, which expresses that RM1’s goal is
to gossip innitely oen: “always” (G) “eventually” (F) gossip (¬s1).
Observe that with all RMs rationally pursuing their goals, they will adopt any
strategy which induces a run where each RM can gossip (with at least one other RM)
innitely oen. In fact, this kind of game-like modelling gives rise to a powerful
characteristic: on all runs that are sustained by a Nash equilibrium, the distributed
system is guaranteed to have two crucial non-starvation/liveness properties: RMs can
gossip innitely oen and clients can be served innitely oen. Indeed, these prop-
erties are veried in the experiments; with E-Nash: no Nash equilibrium sustains “all
RMs forever gossiping”; and with A-Nash: in all Nash equilibria at least one of the
RM is in servicing mode innitely oen. We also notice that each RM is modelled as
a non-deterministic open system: non-determinism is used in the rst two updated
commands, as they have the same guard s1 and therefore will be both enabled at the
same time; and the system is open since each module’s state space and choices depend
on the states of other modules, as reected by the third updated command.
Replica Control Protocol. Consensus is a key issue in distributed computing and multi-
agent systems. An important application domain is in maintaining data consistency.
Giord [37] proposed a quorum-based voting protocol to ensure data consistency by
not allowing more than one processes to read/write a data item concurrently. To do
this, each copy of a replicated item is assigned a vote.
We can model a (modied version of) Giord’s protocol as a game as follows. e
set of players N = {1, . . . , n} in the game is arranged in a request queue represented
12e core of the protocol involves (at least) pairwise interactions periodically.
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Figure 9: Giord’s protocol modelled as a game.
by the sequence of states q1, . . . , qn, where qi means that player i is requesting to
read/write the data item. At state qi, other players in N\{i} then can vote whether
to allow player i to read/write. If the majority of players in N vote “yes”, then the
transition goes to q0, i.e., player i is allowed to read/write, and otherwise it goes to
qi+1
13. e voting process then restarts from q1. e protocol’s structure is shown in
Figure 9. Notice that at the last state, qn, there is only one outgoing arrow to q0. As
in the previous example, the goal of each player i is to visit q0 right aer qi innitely
oen, so that the desired behaviour of the system is sustained on all Nash equilibria of
the system: a data item is not concurrently accessed by two dierent processes and the
data is updated in every round. e associated temporal properties are automatically
veried in the experiments in Section 8.3. Specically, the temporal properties we
check are as follows. With E-Nash: there is no Nash equlibrium in which the data is
never updated; and, with A-Nash: on all Nash equilibria, for each player, its request
will be granted innitely oen. Also, in this example, we dene a module, called
“Environment”, which is used to represent the underlying concurrent game structure,
shown in Figure 9, where the game is played.
8.3. Experiment I
In order to evaluate the practical performance of our tool and approach (against
MCMAS and PRALINE), we present results on the temporal equilibrium analysis for
the examples in Section 8.2. We ran the tools on the two examples with dierent
13We assume arithmetic modulo (|N|+ 1) in this example.
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Table 1: Gossip Protocol experiment results.
P S E
EVE PRALINE MCMAS
ν (s)  (s) α (s) ν (s)  (s) α (s) ν (s)  (s) α (s)
2 4 9 0.02 0.24 0.08 0.02 1.71 1.73 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 8 27 0.09 0.43 0.26 0.33 26.74 27.85 0.02 0.06 0.06
4 16 81 0.42 3.51 1.41 0.76 547.97 548.82 760.65 3257.56 3272.57
5 32 243 2.30 35.80 25.77 10.06 TO TO TO TO TO
6 64 729 16.63 633.68 336.42 255.02 TO TO TO TO TO
7 128 2187 203.05 TO TO 5156.48 TO TO TO TO TO
8 256 6561 4697.49 TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO
Table 2: Replica control experiment results.
P S E
EVE PRALINE MCMAS
ν (s)  (s) α (s) ν (s)  (s) α (s) ν (s)  (s) α (s)
2 3 8 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.64 0.74 0.01 0.01 0.02
3 4 20 0.11 1.53 0.22 0.12 4.96 5.46 0.02 0.06 0.11
4 5 48 0.34 1.73 0.68 0.56 65.50 67.45 1.99 4.15 11.28
5 6 112 1.43 2.66 2.91 6.86 1546.90 1554.80 1728.73 6590.53 TO
6 7 256 5.87 13.69 16.03 94.39 TO TO TO TO TO
7 8 576 32.84 76.50 102.12 2159.88 TO TO TO TO TO
8 9 1280 166.60 485.99 746.55 TO TO TO TO TO TO
numbers of players (“P”), states (“S”), and edges (“E”). e experiments were obtained
on a PC with Intel i5-4690S CPU 3.20 GHz machine with 8 GB of RAM running Linux
kernel version 4.12.14-300.fc26.x86 64. We report the running time14 for solving Non-
14To carry out a fairer comparison (since PRALINE does not accept LTL goals), we added to PRALINE’s
running time the time needed to convert LTL games into its input.
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Emptiness (“ν”), E-Nash (“”), and A-Nash (“α”). For the last two problems, since
there is no direct support in PRALINE and MCMAS, we used the reduction of E/A-
Nash to Non-Emptiness presented in [35]. Intuitively, the reduction is as follows:
given a gameG and formulaϕ, we construct a new gameH with two additional agents,
say n + 1 and n + 2, with goals γn+1 = ϕ ∨ (p ↔ q) and γn+2 = ϕ ∨ ¬(p ↔ q),
where Φn+1 = {p} and Φn+2 = {q}, p and q are fresh Boolean variables. is means
that it is the case NE(H) 6= ∅ if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium run in G
satisfying ϕ.
From the experiment results shown in Table 1 and 2, we observe that, in general,
EVE has the best performance, followed by PRALINE and MCMAS. Although PRA-
LINE performed beer than MCMAS, both struggled (timed-out15) with inputs with
more than 100 edges, while EVE could handle up to 6000 edges (for Non-Emptiness).
8.4. Experiment II
is experiment is taken from the motivating examples in [38]. Suppose the sys-
tems shown in Figure 10 and 11 represents a 3-player game, where each transition
is labelled by the actions x, y, z of player 1, 2, and 3, respectively, an asterisk ∗ be-
ing a wildcard. e goals of the players can be represented by the LTL formulae
γ1 = Fp, γ2 = Fq, and γ3 = G¬(p ∨ q). e system in Figure 10 has a Nash equi-
librium, whereas no (non-bisimulation-invariant strategies) Nash equilibria exists in
the (bisimilar) system in Figure 11.
In this experiment, we extended the number of states by adding more layers to
the game structures used there in order to test the practical performance of EVE,
MCMAS, and PRALINE. e experiments were performed on a PC with Intel i7-
4702MQ CPU 2.20GHz machine with 12GB of RAM running Linux kernel version
4.14.16-300.fc26.x86 64. We divided the test cases based on the number of Kripke
states and edges; then, for each case, we report (i) the total running time16 (“time”)
and (ii) whether the tools nd any Nash equilibria (“NE”).
15Time-out was xed to be 7200 seconds.
16Similarly to Experiment I (Section 8.3), we added to PRALINE’s running time the time needed to convert
LTL games into its input to carry out a fairer comparison.
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∗, a, b′
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∗, b, b′
∗, ∗, ∗
∗, ∗, ∗
∗, ∗, ∗
Figure 10: A 3-player game with Nash equilibrium.
Table 3 shows the results of the experiments on the example in which the model
of strategies that depends only on the run (sequence of states) of the game (run-based
strategies [38]) cannot sustain any Nash equilibria, a model of strategies that is not
invariant under bisimilarity. Indeed, since MCMAS and PRALINE use this model of
strategies, both did not nd any Nash equilibria in the game, as shown in Table 3.
EVE, which uses a model of strategies that not only depends on the run of the game
but also on the actions of players (computation-based [38]), found a Nash equilibrium
in the game. We can also see that EVE outperformed MCMAS on games with 14 or
more states. In fact, MCMAS timed-out17 on games with 17 states or more, while EVE
kept working eciently for games of bigger size. We can also observe that PRALINE
performed almost as eciently as EVE in this experiment, although EVE performed
beer in both small and large instances of these games.
17We xed the time-out value to be 3600 seconds (1 hour).
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Figure 11: A 3-player game without (non-bisimulation-invariant strategies) Nash equilibria.
In Table 4, we used the example in which Nash equilibria is sustained in run-
based strategies. As shown in the table, MCMAS found Nash equilibria in games with
6 and 9 states. However, since MCMAS uses imperfect recall, when the third layer
was added (case with 12 states in Table 4) to the game, it could not nd any Nash
equilibria. Regarding running times, EVE outperformed MCMAS from the game with
12 states and beyond, where MCMAS timed-out on games with 15 or more states.
As for PRALINE, it performed comparably to EVE in this experiment, but again, EVE
performed beer in all instances.
8.5. Experiment III
is experiment is based on the example previously presented in Section 2. For
this particular experiment, we assume that initially the agents are located at opposing
corners of the grid; specically, agent 1 is located at the top-le corner (coordinate
(0, 0)) and agent 2 at the boom-right corner (n−1, n−1). A number of obstacles are
also placed (uniformly) randomly on the grid. We use a binary encoding to represent
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Table 3: Example with no Nash equilibrium.
states edges
MCMAS EVE PRALINE
time (s) NE time (s) NE time (s) NE
5 80 0.04 No 0.75 Yes 0.77 No
8 128 0.24 No 2.99 Yes 2.06 No
11 176 6.28 No 3.86 Yes 4.42 No
14 224 273.14 No 7.46 Yes 8.53 No
17 272 TO – 13.31 Yes 15.33 No
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
50 800 TO – 655.80 Yes 789.77 No
Table 4: Example with Nash equilibria
states edges
MCMAS EVE PRALINE
time (s) NE time (s) NE time (s) NE
6 96 0.02 Yes 1.09 Yes 1.19 Yes
9 144 0.77 Yes 3.36 Yes 3.76 Yes
12 192 65.31 No 7.45 Yes 8.89 Yes
15 240 TO – 15.52 Yes 17.72 Yes
18 288 TO – 30.06 Yes 30.53 Yes
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
51 816 TO – 1314.47 Yes 1563.79 Yes
the spatial information of the grid world which includes the grid coordinates, as well
as the obstacles and the agents locations. For instance, to encode a position of an agent
1 in 4×4 grid, we need 4 Boolean variables arranged as a tuple pos1 =〈x10, x11, y10 , y11〉.
An instance of such a tuple pos1 = 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉 means that agent 1 is at (2, 1). For
each time step and i ∈ {1, 2}, the update guarded command set Ui is such a way
that agent i can only move horizontally and vertically, 1 step at a time. Furthermore,
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Figure 12: Plots from Table 5. Y-axis is in logarithmic scale.
the commands in Ui respect the legality of movement, i.e., agent i cannot move out
of bound or into an obstacle. e goal of each agent can be expressed by the LTL
formulae
γ1 = F(
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
x1i ∧
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
y1i )
and
γ2 = F(
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
¬x2i ∧
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
¬y2i ).
A safety specication (no more than one agent occupying the same position at the
same time) can be expressed by the following LTL formula:
ϕ = G¬(
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
(x1i ↔ x2i ) ∧
∧
i∈{0,...,n−1}
(y1i ↔ y2i )).
e experiment was obtained on a PC with Intel i5-4690S CPU 3.20 GHz machine
with 8 GB of RAM running Linux kernel version 4.12.14-300.fc26.x86 64. We varied
the size of the grid world (“size”) from 3 × 3 to 10 × 10, each with a xed number
of obstacles (“# Obs”), randomly distributed on the grid. We report the number of
Kripke states (“KS”), Kripke edges (“KE”), GPAR states (“GS”), GPAR edges (“GE”),
Non-Emptiness execution time (“ν”), and E-Nash execution time (“”). We ran the
experiment for ve replications, and report the average (ave), minimum (min), and
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Table 5: Grid world experiment results.
Size # Obs KS KE GS
3 3 15(13, 18) 44(32, 72) 60(53, 73)
4 6 40(32, 52) 150(98, 200) 156(121, 209)
5 10 94(61, 125) 398(242, 512) 376(453, 741)
6 15 155(113, 185) 655(450, 800) 619(453, 741)
7 21 228(181, 290) 994(800, 1250) 909(725, 1161)
8 28 491(394, 666) 2297(1922, 2888) 1963(1577, 2665)
9 36 564(269, 765) 2687(1352, 3698) 2256(1077, 3061)
10 45 916(730, 1258) 4780(3528, 6498) 3657(2921, 5033)
Size GE ν (s)  (s)
3 173(129, 289) 0.44(0.19, 1.14) 1.21(0.5, 2.63)
4 595(379, 801) 0.98(0.63, 1.16) 1.57(1.01, 2.24)
5 1591(969, 2049) 4.73(2.62, 6.22) 22.51(18.22, 26.25)
6 2622(1801, 3201) 9.53(7.13, 11.49) 32.32(26.05, 37.35)
7 3969(3161, 5001) 17.69(13.81, 21.58) 48.90(39.70, 59.50)
8 9190(7689, 11553) 50.91(38.38, 72.49) 121.33(95.03, 167.25)
9 10748(5409, 14793) 100.94(45.81, 137.91) 6002.80(5477.63, 6374.26)
10 19102(14113, 25993) 211.30(152.74, 311.43) 6871.16(6340.64, 7650.87)
maximum (max) times from the replications. e results are reported in Table 5, with
the following format: ave(min,max).
From the experiment results, we see that EVE works well for Non-Emptiness up
until size 10. From the plots in Figure 12, we can clearly see that the values of each
variable, except for , grow exponentially. For  (E-Nash), however, it seems to grow
faster than the rest. Specically, it is clearly visible in transitions between numbers
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that have dierent size of bit representation, i.e., 4 to 5 and 8 to 918. ese jumps
correspond to the time used to build deterministic parity automata on words from
LTL properties to be checked in E-Nash, which is essentially, bit-for-bit comparisons
between the position of agent 1 and 2.
From the experiments shown in this section it is also clear that the boleneck in
the performance is the translation of LTL goals and the high-level description of the
game into the underlying parity game. Once an explicit parity game is constructed,
then the performance improves radically. is result is perfectly consistent with what
the theoretical complexity of the decision procedure predicts: our algorithm works
in doubly-exponential time in the size of the goals of the players, while it is only
singly-exponential in the size of the SRML specication. ese two exponential-time
reductions are in fact optimal, so there is no hope that they can be improved, at least
in theory. On the other hand, the actual subroutine that nds a Nash equilibrium and
computes players’ strategies from the parity games representation of the problem is
rather ecient in theory – but still not known to be in polynomial time using the best
algorithms to solve parity games. en, it is clear that a natural way to make rational
verication a feasible problem, in theory, is to look at cases where goals and/or game
representations are simpler. Such study is conducted in [46], where several positive
results on the complexity of solving the rational verication problem are obtained.
9. Concluding Remarks and Related Work
is paper contains a complete study, from theory to implementation, of the tem-
poral equilibrium analysis of multi-agent AI systems formally modelled as multi-
player games. e two main contributions of the paper are: (1) a novel and optimal
decision procedure, based on the solution of parity games, that can be used to solve
both the rational verication and the automated synthesis problems for multi-player
games; and (2) a complete implementation of the general game-theoretic modelling
and reasoning framework – with full support of goals expressed as LTL formulae and
18Since the grid coordinate index starts at 0, the “actual” transitions are 3 to 4 and 7 to 8.
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high-level game descriptions in SRML – which is available online. Our work builds
on several previous results in the computer science (synthesis and verication) and AI
literatures (multi-agent systems). Relevant related literature will be discussed next.
Equilibrium Analysis in Multi-Agent Systems. Rational verication was pro-
posed as an complementary verication methodology to conventional methods, such
as model checking. A legitimate question is, then, when is rational verication an
appropriate verication approach? A possible answer is given next. e verication
problem [24], as conventionally formulated, is concerned with checking that some
property, usually dened using a modal or a temporal logic [28], holds on some or on
every computation run of a system. In a game-theoretic seing, this can be a very
strong requirement – and in some cases even inappropriate – since only some com-
putations of the system will arise (be sustained) as the result of agents in the system
choosing strategies in equilibrium, that is, due to strategic and rational play. It was
precisely this concern that motivated the rational verication approach [42, 77]. In
rational verication, we ask if a given temporal property holds on some or every com-
putation run that can be sustained by agents choosing Nash equilibrium strategies.
Rational verication can be reduced to the Non-Emptiness problem, as stated in this
paper; cf., [35]. As a consequence, along with the polynomial transformations in [35],
our results provide a complete framework (theory, algorithms, and implementation)
for automated temporal equilibrium analysis, specically, to do rational synthesis and
formal verication of logic-based multi-agent systems. e framework, in particu-
lar, provides a concrete and algorithmic solution to the rational synthesis problem as
studied in [32], where the Boolean case (iterated games where players control Boolean
variables, whose valuations dene sequences of states in the game, i.e., the plays in
the game) was given an interesting automata-theoretic solution via (an extension of)
Strategy Logic [23].
Automata and logic. In computer science, a common technique to reason about
Nash equilibria in multi-player games is using alternating parity automata on in-
nite trees (APTs [59]). is approach is used to do rational synthesis [32, 53]; equi-
librium checking and rational verication [77, 41, 42]; and model checking of logics
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for strategic reasoning capable to specify the existence of a Nash equilibrium in con-
current game structures [7], both in two-player games [23, 30] and in multi-player
games [58, 64]. In cases where players’ goals are simpler than general LTL formu-
lae, e.g., for reachability or safety goals, alternating Bu¨chi automata can be used in-
stead [14]. Our technique is dierent from all these automata-based approaches, and
in some cases more general, as it can be used to handle either a more complex model
of strategies or a more complex type of goals, and delivers an immediate procedure
to synthesise individual strategies for players in the game, while being amenable to
implementation.
Tools and algorithms. In theory, the kind of equilibrium analysis that can be done
usingMCMAS [19, 22, 21] and PRALINE [16, 14] rely on the automata-based approach.
However, the algorithms that are actually implemented have a dierent avour. MC-
MAS uses a procedure for SL which works as a labelling algorithm since it only consid-
ers memoryless strategies [21]. On the other hand, PRALINE, which works for Bu¨chi
denable objectives, uses a procedure based on the “suspect game” [14]. Despite some
similarities between our construction and the suspect game, introduced in [14], the
two procedures are substantially dierent. Unlike our procedure, the suspect game is
a standard two-player zero-sum turn-based game H(G, pi), constructed from a game
G and a possible path pi, in which one of the players (“Eve”) has a winning strategy
if, and only if, pi can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium in G. e overall procedure
in [14] relies on the construction of such a game, whose size (space complexity) is
exponential in the number of agents [14, Section 4.3]. Instead, our procedure solves,
independently, a collection of parity games that avoids an exponential use of space but
may require to be executed exponentially many times. Key to the correctness of our
approach is that we deal with parity conditions, which are prex-independent, ensur-
ing that punishment strategies do not depend on the history of the game. Regarding
similarities, our procedure also checks for the existence of a path sustained by a Nash
Equilibrium, but our algorithm does this for every subsetW ⊆ N of agents, if needed.
Doing this (i.e., trading exponential space for exponential time), at every call of this
subroutine, our algorithm avoids building an exponentially sized game, likeH. On the
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other hand, from a practical point of view, avoiding the construction of such an expo-
nential sized game leads to beer performance (running times), even in cases where
no Nash equilibrium exists, when our subroutine is necessarily called exponentially
many times. In addition to all of the above, neither the algorithm used forMCMAS nor
the one used for PRALINE computes pure Nash equilibria in a bisimulation-invariant
framework, as our procedure does. While MCMAS and PRALINE are the two closest
tools to EVE, they are not the only available options to reason about games. For in-
stance, PRISM-games [55], EAGLE [71], and UPPAAL [26] are other interesting tools
to reason about games. PRISM-games allows one to do strategy synthesis for turn-
based stochastic games as well as model checking for long-run, average, and ratio
rewards properties. Only until very recently, PRISM-games had no support of equi-
librium reasoning, but see [54]. EAGLE is a tool specically designed to reason about
pure Nash equilibria in multi-player games. EAGLE considers games where goals are
given as CTL formulae and allows one to check if a given strategy prole is a Nash
equilibrium of a given multi-agent system. is decision problem, called Member-
ship within the rational verication framework [77], is, theoretically, simpler than
Non-Emptiness: while the former can be solved in EXPTIME (for branching-time
goals expressed using CTL formulae [43]), the laer is 2EXPTIME-complete for LTL
goals, and even 2EXPTIME-hard for CTL goals and nondeterministic strategies [43].
UPPAAL is another tool that can be used to analyse equilibrium behaviour in a sys-
tem [25, 17]. However, UPPAAL diers from EVE in various critical ways: e.g., it works
in a quantitative seing, uses statistical model checking, and most importantly, com-
putes approximate Nash equilibria of a game.
eRole of Bisimilarity. One crucial aspect of our approach to rational verication
and synthesis is the role of bisimilarity [62, 49, 27, 75]. Bisimulation is the most impor-
tant type of behavioural equivalence relation considered in computer science, and in
particular two bisimilar systems will satisfy the same temporal logic properties. In our
seing, it is highly desirable that properties which hold in equilibrium are sustained
across all bisimilar systems to P1, . . . , Pn. at is, that for every (temporal logic)
property ϕ and every system component P ′i modelled as an agent in a multi-player
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game, if P ′i is bisimilar to Pi ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn}, then ϕ is satised in equilibrium – that
is, on a run induced by some Nash equilibrium of the game – by P1, . . . , Pi, . . . Pn if
and only if is also satised in equilibrium by P1, . . . , P ′i , . . . , Pn, the system in which
Pi is replaced by P ′i , that is, across all bisimilar systems to P1, . . . , Pn. is property
is called invariance under bisimilarity. Unfortunately, as shown in [40, 38], the satis-
faction of temporal logic properties in equilibrium is not invariant under bisimilarity,
thus posing a challenge for the modular and compositional reasoning of concurrent
systems, since individual system components in a concurrent system cannot be re-
placed by (behaviourally equivalent) bisimilar ones, while preserving the temporal
logic properties that the overall multi-agent system satises in equilibrium. is is
also a problem from a synthesis point of view. Indeed, a strategy for a system com-
ponent Pi may not be a valid strategy for a bisimilar system component P ′i . As a
consequence, the problem of building strategies for individual processes in the con-
current system P1, . . . , Pi, . . . Pn may not, in general, be the same as building strate-
gies for a bisimilar system P1, . . . , P ′i , . . . Pn, again, deterring any hope of being able
to do modular reasoning on concurrent and multi-agent systems. ese problems
were rst identied in [40] and further studied in [38]. However, no algorithmic so-
lutions to these two problems were presented in either [40] or [38]. Specically, in
this paper, bisimilarity was exploited in two ways. Firstly, our construction of punish-
ment strategies (used in the characterisation of Nash equilibrium given by eorem 3)
assumes that players have access to the history of choices that other players in the
game have made. As shown in [38, 39], with a model of strategies where this is not
the case, the preservation of Nash equilibria in the game, as well as of temporal logic
properties in equilibrium, may not be guaranteed. Secondly, our implementation in
EVE guarantees that any two games whose underlying CGSs are bisimilar, and there-
fore should be regarded as observationally equivalent from a concurrency point of
view, will produce the same answers to the rational verication and automated syn-
thesis problems. It is also worth noting that even though bisimilarity is probably the
most widely used behavioural equivalence in concurrency, in the context of multi-
agent systems other relations may be preferred, for instance, equivalence relations
that take a detailed account of the independent interactions and behaviour of indi-
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vidual components in a multi-agent system. In such a seing, “alternating” relations
with natural ATL∗ characterisations have been studied [8]. Alternating bisimulation
is very similar to bisimilarity on labelled transition systems [62, 49], only that when
dened on CGSs, instead of action proles (directions) taken as possible transitions,
one allows individual player’s actions, which must be matched in the bisimulation
game. Because of this, it immediately follows that any alternating bisimulation as
dened in [8] is also a bisimilarity as dened here. Despite having a dierent formal
denition, a simple observation can be made: Nash equilibria are not preserved by
the alternating (bisimulation) equivalence relations in [8] either, which discourages
the use of these even stronger equivalence relations for multi-agent systems. In fact,
as discussed in [73], the “right” notion of equivalence for games (which can be indi-
rectly used as an observationally equivalence between multi-agent systems) and their
game theoretic solution concepts is, undoubtedly, an important and interesting topic
of debate, which deserves to be investigated further.
Some features of our framework. Unlike other approaches to rational synthesis
and temporal equilibrium analysis, e.g. [21, 14, 32, 42], we employ parity games [29],
which are an intuitively simple verication model with an abundant associated set of
algorithmic solutions [33]. In particular, strategies in our framework, as in [42], can
depend on players’ actions, leading to a much richer game-theoretic seing where
Nash equilibrium is invariant under bisimilarity [38, 39], a desirable property for con-
current and reactive systems [62, 49, 27, 75]. Our reasoning and verication approach
applies to multi-player games that are concurrent and synchronous, with perfect re-
call and perfect information, and which can be represented in a high-level, succinct
manner using SRML [74]. In addition, the technique developed in this paper, and its
associated implementation, considers games with LTL goals, deterministic and pure
strategies, and dichotomous preferences. In particular, strategies in these games are
assumed to be able to see all past players’ actions. We do not consider mixed or non-
deterministic strategies, or goals given by branching-time formulae. We also do not
allow for quantitative or probabilistic systems, e.g., such as stochastic games or similar
game models. We note, however, that some of these aspects of our reasoning frame-
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work have been placed to avoid undesirable computational properties. For instance, it
is known that checking for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in multi-player games
like the ones we consider is an undecidable problem if either imperfect information
or (various kinds of) quantitative/probabilistic information is allowed [47, 72].
FutureWork. is paper gives a solution to the temporal equilibrium problem (both
automated synthesis and formal verication) in a noncooperative seing. In future
work, we plan to investigate the cooperative games seing [4]. e paper also solves
the problem in practice for perfect information games. We also plan to investigate if
our main algorithms can be extended to decidable classes of imperfect information
games, for instance, as those studied to model the behaviour of multi-agent systems
in [47, 12, 10, 13]. Whenever possible, such studies will be complemented with prac-
tical implementations in EVE. Finally, extensions to epistemic systems and quantita-
tive information in the context of multi-agent systems may be another avenue for
further applications [50, 11], as well as seings with more complex preference rela-
tions [43, 32, 44, 5], which would provide a strictly stronger modelling power.
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